Network monitoring systems that detect and analyze malicious activities as well as respond against them, are becoming increasingly important. As malwares, such as worms, viruses, and bots, can inflict significant damages on both infrastructure and end user, technologies for identifying such propagating malwares are in great demand. In the largescale darknet monitoring operation, we can see that malwares have various kinds of scan patterns that involves choosing destination IP addresses. Since many of those oscillations seemed to have a natural periodicity, as if they were signal waveforms, we considered to apply a spectrum analysis methodology so as to extract a feature of malware. With a focus on such scan patterns, this paper proposes a novel concept of malware feature extraction and a distinct analysis method named "SPectrum Analysis for Distinction and Extraction of malware features (SPADE)". Through several evaluations using real scan traffic, we show that SPADE has the significant advantage of recognizing the similarities and dissimilarities between the same and different types of malwares.
Introduction
Malwares are spread all over the Internet and often leads to serious security incidents that can cause significant damage to both infrastructure and end users. As countermeasures, a number of ongoing network monitoring projects are already in their operational phase [1] - [9] . Many of these projects are concentrating on the event analysis that provides statistical data, such as rapid increase in access on certain port numbers, by using network event monitoring. Particularly, it is becoming popular to monitor a dark address space (darknet), which is a set of globally announced unused IP addresses [10] , [11] .
In order to identify the root causes of network events observed on darknets, we have started the Network Incident analysis Center for Tactical Emergency Response (nicter) project, with the goal of achieving an integrated analysis of security incidents on large networks [12] - [14] . Our present focus is particularly on detecting and identifying the propagation of malwares such as worms, viruses, and bots, which can infect remote hosts through fundamental propagation steps, such as scan → exploit code → malware download, by exploiting the vulnerabilities of operating systems or server applications of the targeted hosts. Although infection methods of malwares are becoming more diversified and sophisticated in recent years (e.g., infection via web browser and USB memories), there are still vast amounts of malwares that spread by use of the network vulnerabilities of remote hosts. For instance, a malware called "Conficker" (aka "Downadup") and its variants spread to all over the world by exploiting a vulnerability of Microsoft Windows named "MS08-067", and inflicted significant damages to many enterprise networks [15] , [16] . In order to detect those malwares' propagation at an incipient stage, nicter monitors a wide region of the global Internet using distributed darknet sensors and then uses various methods to analyze the collected security events.
In darknet monitoring, it is important to categorize the observed attacking hosts, which enables us to grasp the global trend in the Internet [12] , such as rises of emerging malwares and large scale DDoS attacks. Namely, if we could identify the malware specimen infecting one of the attacking hosts in a certain cluster, we can figure out a bunch of hosts infected by the same malware at one time. Consequently, information such as a list of attacking hosts and their malware specimens can be published to other organizations at the first stage of rises of emerging malwares so that we can indirectly limit further expansion of them. On the other hand, through our large-scale darknet monitoring operation, we have learned that malware uses various kinds of scan patterns, that involves choosing destination IP addresses [17] - [20] , such as regular increment or random determination of destination IP addresses for each packet. Since these scan patterns resemble a signal waveform, we applied the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) algorithm to the feature extraction and distinction method.
In this paper, we propose a malware feature extraction and distinction method called SPectrum Analysis for Distinction and Extraction of malware features (SPADE), which analyzes the scan traffic data from a pair of attacking hosts and derives the correlation coefficient between them. The contribution of this paper is as follows.
1. We define some requirements of a malware correlation method that can deal with the differences of network conditions among darknet sensors, and proposed the SPADE algorithm which employs the discrete Fourier transform (DFT). 2. We propose the SPADE, a novel algorithm which extracts the feature of malwares from their scan patterns
Copyright c 2010 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers and derives correlation between a pair of hosts. 3. We develop a simple clustering algorithm which employs the SPADE as a distance function and clusters the attacking hosts based on the similarity of scan patterns within a permissible time. 4. Through several qualitative evaluations using various scan traffic observed in the darknet monitoring, we confirm that the SPADE algorithm successfully satisfies above requirements. Moreover, by demonstrating an experimental clustering and a performance evaluation with the SPADE and the clustering algorithm, we verify the practicality and effectiveness of them for the global trend analysis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 introduces the background of this research and related works. Section 3 discusses the requirements for the malware feature extraction algorithm. The details of the SPADE algorithm are explained in Sect. 4. Some concrete evaluations using proposed algorithm with actual darknet traffic are presented in Sect. 5. Finally, Sect. 6 presents our conclusions and future work.
Background
As a background of this research, we first explain the darknet monitoring and its advantage. Second, we show that malwares have various scan patterns according to our longterm and large-scale darknet monitoring, which can be used to classify the malwares. Third, we mention some related works.
Darknet Monitoring
A darknet is a set of globally announced unused IP addresses and using it is a good way to monitor network attacks, such as by malwares' scans. A big advantage of darknet monitoring is that there is no legitimate host using these addresses; we can thus consider all incoming traffic to be a consequence of some kind of malicious activity or the result of misconfigurations. Moreover, since there are no common end users, a darknet is suitable for extensive monitoring coverage without any of the problems related to privacy issues encountered when monitoring the real (live) network. As the principal darknet monitoring method, we deployed the black hole sensors, which quietly monitor incoming packets without ever responding to the opposite hosts. By using these blackhole sensors in the darknet IP domains, we could observe emerging network attacks, including malware-initiated network scan, malware infection behavior, and DDoS backscatters.
Scan Pattern of Malwares
According to our long-term and large-scale darknet monitoring and some previous researches [17] - [20] , malwares use various kinds of scan patterns. These patterns can be important clues to classify the malwares. Figure 1 shows examples of the typical scan patterns that are observed by the nicter's blackhole sensors. These graphs represent the scan patterns coming from five individual attacking hosts A-E that are probably assumed to be infected by different types of malwares. In each graph, the X axis indicates the packet arrival sequence and the Y axis indicates the value of the destination IP address of our /16 blackhole sensor.
The examples tell us that there are various scan patterns, such as regular increment pattern (A, C); random determination pattern (D, E); and specific rule-based pattern while it seems to be a random pattern (B). Through this observations, we found that scan patterns of malwares have their individual characteristics, and also found that many of the patterns seem to have the the natural periodicity, as if they are signal waveforms. Consequently, we apply a spectrum analysis method to the scan traffic in order to extract their characteristics and to classify them.
As we mentioned in the previous section, infection methods of malwares are becoming more sophisticated in recent years, so that scan and propagation patterns of botnets can be easily tuned dynamically and individually by the botmasters (herders). However, since a herder publishes a same scan order to a number of bots simultaneously in many cases, we believe that there must be similarities among scan behaviors of individual hosts.
Through this study, we found that the destination IP address oscillations observed by the blackhole sensors have their own characteristics, and that many of them seem to have a natural periodicity, as if they are signal waveforms. Consequently, we considered applying a spectrum analysis method to the scan traffic, which is commonly employed for the feature extraction of input data in signal processing research.
Related Works
Darknet Monitoring There have been numerous studies on network monitoring and event analysis. Some of these have observed darknets to detect anomalous activities, and have provided statistical data, such as the rapid increase of accesses on certain port numbers [1] - [4] , [8] .
Some researchers [10] , [11] , [21] , [22] have monitored darknets in an entirely passive manner by examining spurious traffic arriving for non-existent hosts, using blackhole sensors, and detecting security events based on statistical algorithms. Though our work falls into this blackhole monitoring category, while most of the previous studies have detected security events based on statistical data, such as the total number of attacking hosts or packets, our work extracted the behavioral characteristics of a single attacking host in order to distinguish them.
Spectrum Analysis
In terms of spectrum analysis, Mitra et al. [23] proposed an anomaly detection method based on spectrum analysis. They focused on the harmonic structure of the traffic data spectrum obtained by the Fourier transform and wavelet to detect DDoS and bottleneck traffic. Meanwhile, Yu et al. [24] employed a spectrum analysis method to detect slow scan worms. The objective of these studies was to detect the presence of anomalous activities in normal traffic on a live network by means of analyzing the fluctuation of traffic volume. In contrast, since our basic tactics is the blackhole monitoring, where most of the observed activities are assumed to be anomalous, we aimed to establish a fine-grained distinction method of attacking hosts based on their scan patterns rather than merely determining whether or not the activities are malicious or not.
Muelder et al. [25] applied the wavelet algorithm to a series data, which consists of destination IP addresses and packet arrival intervals in a single scan traffic, so as to characterize it and distinguish from other scan traffic. In this study, they supposed that the sizes of subnetworks in a pair of observed data should be same each other (e.g., /24) for the comparison. However, since a size of a monitored subnetwork varies widely with respect to each sensor, it is difficult to apply their method to scan traffic observed in a practical large scale darknet monitoring.
Requirements of Malware Correlation Method
In this section, we discuss a method to extract features of malware solely from its scan packets and discuss the most appropriate way to distinguish different malwares. According to the assumptions which we studied in the previous section, the correlation analysis method must satisfy the following requirements:
(a) To be independent from a position of monitored IP address range
Since the IP addresses monitored by sensors are scattered across the global IP address range, even if scan packets sent by a single host are observed by multiple sensors, the destination IP address ranges will differ greatly. Therefore, the correlation analysis algorithm must be independent of the sensors' IP address ranges.
(b) To be independent from a size of monitored IP address range
The sizes of the IP address ranges monitored by sensors are not constant, and there are various kinds of subnet mask lengths such as /24, /16, and /8. Because the number of packets from a single attacking host will vary widely across the different monitored IP address ranges, the correlation analysis algorithm must have the capability to ignore the differences in the observed packet counts.
(c) To allow minor packet losses and disorders in a packet arrival sequence
It is known that minor packet losses and disorders in the packet arrival sequences occur frequently as the network condition deteriorates. Thus, the correlation algorithm must ignore these minor characteristics.
In order to respond to these requirements, we consider employing a spectrum analysis technique, namely the Fourier transform method, as the feature extraction and distinction technique. Finally, the frequency components are used to derive the correlation coefficient with another set of scan data.
This method has the following benefits in terms of the above three requirements:
(α) The Fourier transform algorithm can compensate for the relative differences in the destination IP address ranges by discarding the DC (Direct Current) component of the spectrum. In other words, if there are similarities in the original signal data, the Fourier transform algorithm can detect them regardless of the position of the destination IP address range. (β) It is commonly known that the inverse Fourier transform can approximately reconstruct the original waveform from only the high-level components of a spectrum that have been extracted by the Fourier transform. Therefore, incorporating this feature, the proposed algorithm employs a certain number of dominant components that characterize the original scan pattern. In this way, the proposed algorithm can investigate the similarity of two different series of data using only a certain number of samples, regardless of the number of packets observed from attacking hosts. (γ) In the spectrum derived using the Fourier transform, minor phenomena such as the loss of several packets or disorders in the packet arrival sequence appear in the high-frequency bands. Therefore, the proposed algorithm can easily ignore these unexpected influences by removing frequency components higher than a certain threshold. 
SPADE: Malware Correlation Method Based on Spectrum Analysis
In this section, the SPADE algorithm is proposed, which is a malware feature extraction and correlation method based on spectrum analysis. SPADE begins with applying the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) to a series of destination IP addresses, and ends at a derivation of a correlation coefficient between two different series of data.
Algorithm of SPADE
An overview of the SPADE algorithm is shown in Fig. 2 .
Hamming Window Function for a Series Data
As a preparation of subsequent processes, the SPADE applies the Hamming window function to the original series data of destination IP addresses in order to emphasize the characteristics of the oscillations. Specifically, where the original series data X has N elements, the following formula is applied to each element X(n);
By passing this process, which is commonly used in signal processing research, the main lobes of spectrum will be emphasized so that we can efficiently extract the features of the scan pattern in the subsequent steps.
Discrete Fourier Transform
Then SPADE applies DFT to the series data ( Fig. 2-1 ) and derives a spectrum ( Fig. 2-1') . In Fig. 2-1 , the vertical axis denotes the IP address and the horizontal axis indicates not time but the arrival sequence of packets. Therefore, the horizontal axis of the spectrum in Fig. 2 -1'does not represent the frequency per say. However,
for an intuitive explanation, we assume that the horizontal axis represents the frequency and the vertical axis, the power level at each frequency in this paper.
Removal of High-Frequency Bands
As we mentioned in Sect. 3, minor phenomena such as packet losses and disorders in the packet arrival sequence appear in the high-frequency bands. Therefore, to avoid these influences, which are the result of the degradation of the network conditions, SPADE removes frequency bands higher than a vertical threshold T (Fig. 2-2 ).
Extraction of Maximum Value Indexes
In this step, SPADE extracts peaks of frequency components, whose magnitudes are higher than neighboring components, because the high-level components in a spectrum are dominant in characterizing the original scanning behavior, as described in Sect. 3. The number of peaks to be extracted is defined by a fixed value P.
With this process, SPADE enables to reduce the number of samples for the subsequent calculations to P. Note that in the following steps, SPADE treats a collective set of indexes I (and not power levels) of the components selected in this step.
Removal of Fundamental Frequency
The purpose of this step is to adjust the numbers of cycles of oscillations among different attacking hosts. Even if some attacking hosts have the same scanning behavior, the packet counts from them may differ widely because of the differences in the conditions of each network sensor. For example, an attacking host α may send three cycles of scan packets to a sensor, while host β sends only one cycle to another sensor. To resolve this, SPADE removes the fundamental frequency from the spectrum while maintaining its harmonic structure. In other words, this process normalizes the scale of the X axis of the spectrum based on the number of observed packets from each attacking host. The normalized index values (N i ) are derived by dividing each index value (I i ) by the index value of the fundamental frequency (I p ) that has the highest power level in the spectrum, as shown by formula (2) .
6. Standardization of Harmonic Structure In this step, SPADE standardizes the weight of each value in the normalized index values N and derives a series of deviation values S . As mentioned in the previous step, the number of observed packets is dependent on the environmental conditions of the sensor. Therefore, the weights of a certain index value in some independent N vary widely depending on the number of samples. To avoid this problem, SPADE standardizes the weights of the index values in N by its standard deviation. Namely, this process computes a series of deviation values (S ) of N. For a series of index values N that has n samples, the standard deviation S D N is derived by;
where M is the average of the all index values. Then, the deviation value of each index value (S i ) is computed from the standard deviation (S D N ) by formula (4).
S i will be employed in the next step.
Synchronization and Alignment of Two Series of Data
As the last step of the preparation process, we must synchronize two independent series of data and adjust their lengths. In this step, SPADE aligns two series based on the index values of their base frequencies. The missing space resulting from the differences in the series lengths is padded with zeros. Thus, the two series of data are synchronized and aligned, ready to be compared with each other.
Derivation of the Correlation Coefficient
Finally, SPADE computes the correlation coefficient between two independent series of data. The correlation coefficient C αβ between series S α and S β is derived by the formula (5).
The correlation coefficient ranges from −1 to 1. An absolute value of coefficient approaches 1 with increasing similarity between the original scan data, and approaches to 0 with decreasing similarity.
A sample result of the SPADE algorithm is shown in Fig. 3 , where two attacking hosts A 1 and A 4 were analyzed. As Fig. 3 - (1) and (2) show, these hosts have similar scan patterns which oscillate destination IP addresses based on a specific rule while it seems to be determined randomly. Figure 3 -(3) tells the picked up maximum values (indicated by × and +) in each spectrum overlaps on six points. As the result, Fig. 3-(4) shows that the correlation coefficient between these hosts is 0.80.
Usage of the SPADE
Since the SPADE is designed for analysis of a pair of hosts, it should be used with other clustering algorithms in order to cluster all attacking hosts at an practical operation phase. Basically, the SPADE will be activated once a day in a batch processing mode. It analyzes all packets from each individual attacking host observed in the day and categorizes them into applicable clusters by another clustering algorithm. Therefore, by monitoring the daily transition of the clusters, we can figure out incidents such as a rise of emerging malwares and large scale DDoS attacks.
Moreover, the SPADE can be used one-to-many analysis responding to demands of other analysis engines. Namely, when an attacking host is picked up by other analysis engines as a pivot data, the SPADE inspects all packets observed in darknet and provides the list of hosts whose scan patterns are similar to the pivot host's one. Thus, if somehow we have knowledge of the malware which is controlling the pivot host, we can figure out the number of hosts infected by the malware and grasp the global trend of malware propagation.
To realize these clustering and one-to-many ondemand analysis, the SPADE has to derive correlation results within a permissible time. Therefore, we will discuss the performance of the SPADE algorithm in Sect. 5.5.
Limitation
Since the SPADE employs the discrete Fourier transform, one of the signal processing algorithms, it requires a certain number of packets for input data. This is because if a number of input packets is too few, the corresponding spectrum and extracted characteristics (peaks) are also become fewer. When the SPADE analyzes a pair of such hosts, as a result, the correlation coefficient may be significantlyinaccurate. In other words, the SPADE may determine these hosts have a high correlation even if they have dissimilar scan patterns. Therefore, we defined a threshold (N) of a minimum packet number for input data of the SPADE algorithm. Through preliminary investigations, we determined the minimum packet number as 100 in this paper.
Evaluation
The purpose of the SPADE is to extract features of scan patterns from individual attacking hosts and derive the similarities or dissimilarities among them. Consequently, this section provides some evaluations using practical traffic data observed at one of nicter's blackhole sensor which monitors a /16 subnet. As expected results, the correlation coefficients among hosts infected by a same type of bot take high values, while low coefficients are derived among different types of bots.
For the evaluation, we use traffic data obtained on a certain day in December, 2008, where 2,271,987 packets from 29,587 hosts were observed. Particularly, the sample hosts A 1 ∼ E 1 appearing through this section correspond to the hosts in Fig. 1 . Through our preliminary investigation, we found the appropriate values for the parameters introduced in Sect. 4; 200 for T (the threshold of limiting frequency) and 20 for P (the number of peaks to be extracted), that influenced the successful results of feature extraction and distinction of malwares. Therefore, note that these values will be employed for the two parameters in the following examinations.
Feasibility Evaluation
This subsection evaluates the SPADE algorithm whether it satisfies the requirements of malware correlation method defined in Sect. 3, namely; (a) To be independent from a position of monitored IP address range, (b) To be independent from a size of monitored IP address range, and (c) To allow minor packet losses and disorders in a packet arrival. Therefore, we compared original scan packets from a single host with experimental data that were modulated from original packets.
Responding to the requirements (a) ∼ (c), three types of experimental data were generated respectively as follows (Fig. 4) ; (α) prefixes of destination IP addresses are changed, (β) the range of monitored IP addresses is resized to half, (γ) 50% of packets are randomly extracted from the original data. We generated these experimental data for each of the five original data (A ∼ E) shown in Fig. 1 , and compared with the original (e.g., A 1 vs. A 1α ). Since the experimental data are generated from their original data, the correlation coefficients are expected to be higher value.
The results are shown in Table 1 . Successfully, the correlation coefficients were higher than 0.70 in most combinations, and their average was 0.87. This result tells us that the SPADE is robust against the differences of network conditions among darknet sensors.
Analyses among Same Bots
Secondary, SPADE analyzed certain five attacking hosts (A 1 ∼ A 5 ) in a same botnet, which sophisticatedly fluctuate destination IP addresses, and derived the correlation coefficients in all combinations ( Table 2 ). Note that these hosts are preliminarily categorized into individual botnets by human operators, based on their compositive similarities such as: the destination port numbers; the start (or end) time of scanning; the subnets of source IP addresses; the payload hash values; and so on. As the result, there were six combinations whose coefficients were over 0.70, within the ten combinations excluding self-comparison, and the coefficient average of those ten combinations was 0.73. Table 4 Correlation results among hosts in different botnets.
1.00 0.31 0.33 0.87 0.59
In the next place, SPADE analyzed other five attacking hosts (B 1 ∼ B 5 ) in another botnet, which linearly increased destination IP addresses. Table 3 shows that there were eight combinations whose coefficients were over 0.70, within the ten combinations, where their average was 0.84.
These results tell that most of correlation coefficients between hosts of a same bot were higher than 0.70. This means that SPADE can recognize that those hosts are infected by a same type of bot.
Analyses among Different Bots
In this subsection, five hosts were analyzed, which belonged to different botnets and had significantly dissimilar scan patterns. As Table 4 shows, there was only one combination whose correlation coefficient was over 0.70 within the ten combinations excluding self-comparison, and the coefficient average of those ten combinations was 0.41. According to this result, we found that SPADE can distinguish hosts which were infected by different types of bots.
One-to-Many Correlation
As an experimentation of the one-to-many correlation, we inspected whole scan traffic by the SPADE algorithm. Specifically, we derived correlation coefficient of each combination between a pivot data (C 1 ) and all of (29,587 of) attackers' hosts. The result is shown in Fig. 5 , where the X axis indicates the absolute value of correlation coefficient from 0.00 to 1.00 and the Y axis indicates the number of hosts on each coefficient value in a log scale.
In this case, as the randomly picked up samples (small figures in Fig. 5) shows, the shapes of objective scan patterns become more similar to the pivot data as the coefficient values close to 1.00. Beside that, more than 90% of coefficients were determined as 0.00 to 0.05, while 1.7% of coefficients were over 0.90.
Through the further validation, we found that these characteristics are common to the other cases. In other words, the SPADE can recognize the candidates of same scan patterns in high possibilities.
Experimental Clustering
This section demonstrates an experimental analysis of attacking hosts with a simple clustering algorithm. As same as the previous subsections, we inspected the whole scan traffic on a certain day in December, 2008, where 29,587 hosts were observed. Among the 29,587 hosts, there were 1,277 hosts who sent more than 100 packets (: the threshold N, as we mentioned in Subsection 4.3).
As a feasibility study, we applied a simple algorithm as shown in Fig. 6 for the clustering. We would note that in this algorithm, since a pivot host is chosen randomly, the clustering results may differ among each trial. Therefore, we made twenty times of trials and verified that each trial showed almost same results (Table 5) . Specifically, the hosts were categorized into 160.95 clusters in average and the standard deviation of the number of clusters among the twenty trials was only 3.62.
Additionally, let us show a result of one of the trials in the circle graph in Fig. 7 , where numbers in the figure indicate the number of hosts in each cluster. In this trial, the 1,277 hosts were categorized into 162 clusters. The scan pattern of hosts that are randomly selected from each of the top four size clusters were also shown in the figure. The most large cluster consisted of hosts that were assumed to be infected by SQL Slammer which emerged from January, 2003 and still are surviving on numerous hosts. Since scan traffic is incoming over the Internet, it is difficult to surely determine malware specimens, however in the most cases, we could confirmed that the hosts within a cluster have quite similar scan patterns.
Performance Evaluation
We measured the performance of the SPADE algorithm with a dataset same as the experimental analysis in Sect. 5.5 in order to verify whether it can derive correlation analysis re- sults within a permissible time. The following measurement was performed on the machine with Intel Xeon 2.6 GHz CPU and 3.0 GB RAM. Table 6 shows the summary of the evaluation. In order to specify the bottleneck, the averages of processes such as file I/O, DFT and correlation were measured. Although the DFT process spend longer time than the other processes, it does not seem as a critical one. As a result, the average time of total processes was 1.88 ms. We would note that there are some miscellaneous processes other than file I/O, DFT and correlation in the implementation of SPADE algorithm, therefore the average of total process is larger than the sum of those processes. Since the number of hosts who send more than 100 packets in the day was 1,277, the one-to-many analysis (mentioned in Sect. 4) will be finished within only a few seconds. Moreover, in the experimental analysis in Sect. 5.5, each of the twenty trials finished within 30 minutes in average. According to these results, we can say that the performance of the SPADE is efficient enough for both batch and one-to-many on-demand analysis. Furthermore, we inspected influences of number of packets on the performance. Figure 8 shows the relations between processing time and number of packets (series data of A and B). From this figure, we can say that processing time does not depending on only number of packets. Actually, the performance of processing time depends on the number of peaks in a spectrum.
Considerations
The evaluation results showed that the SPADE satisfied the requirements of malware correlation method defined in Sect. 3. Moreover, it derived higher correlation coefficients between each combination within the same botnets while lower coefficients were derived within the different botnets. This means that SPADE almost successfully extracted mal-wares' features and distinguished them. However, in some cases, the results also showed that the correlation coefficients widely varied from 0.59 to 0.98 even though the hosts belonged to a same botnet. This is because when magnitudes (the value of Y axis in a spectrum) of extracted peaks in a series data are close to each other, disorder of the obtained indexes may occur. Therefore, if we compute the correlation coefficient with these disordered indexes, an inaccurate result will be induced. In order to prevent this inaccuracy, we should consider techniques to emphasize the magnitudes of peaks in the spectrum. We would note that we have defined the threshold of correlation coefficient as 0.7 in this paper. Although this value is a empirically defined through the development of the SPADE system, we could obtain efficient results in the evaluations. However, in order to improve the accuracy of the analysis, we would consider more appropriate threshold value as a future work.
One of the contributions of this research is to propose an algorithm which can be used as a distance function for clustering hosts in order to grasp the global trend of malware propagation. In comparison with the previous work, [25] requires a pair of series data to be same each other (e.g., /24) for the correlation analysis, while the SPADE does not depend on size of monitored address range at all. Moreover, since the clustering algorithm of [25] computes correlation coefficients between all combinations of hosts in order to draw a complete graph, the degradation of the performance is exponential. In contrast, in this paper, we have evaluated the performance of the SPADE algorithm and proved its efficiency and practicality for the global trend analysis.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, focusing on the oscillations of the destination IP addresses of scan packets, we proposed a concept of malware feature extraction, and implemented and evaluated a distinct analysis method (SPADE) which applied a spectrum analysis methodology. Our contribution is to realize a fundamental technology to grasp a global trend of malware propagation only from their scan traffic data.
Specifically, we defined some requirements of a malware correlation method that deal with the differences of network conditions among darknet sensors, and proposed the SPADE algorithm which employs the discrete Fourier transform (DFT). Through some qualitative evaluations, we showed that the SPADE successfully satisfies those requirements. Additionally, the SPADE algorithm was applied to a simple clustering algorithm as a distance function. By demonstrating an experimental analysis and a performance evaluation, we verified the practicality and effectiveness of the SPADE toward the global trend analysis.
Although we applied the oscillations of the destination IP addresses of scan packets in our algorithm, we have to further consider other parameterized characteristics such as the source / destination port numbers and the interval time of packet arrival. As the future work, we will attempt to establish more multifaceted analysis techniques covering such parameters based on the SPADE algorithm.
